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PANEL I
OVERVIEW OF U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS
AND FOREIGN ISSUERS
James R Silkenat*
My job this morning is to focus your attention on the topic
at hand, U.S. securities markets and access for foreign compa-
nies. Our excellent panel today will detail the specific questions
foreign companies face concerning U.S. markets and foreign is-
suers. After giving you a little background on what the state of
play currently is in the United States, I am simply going to leave
you with a few questions that I hope you will pose to our panel-
ists during the course of the program.
Foreign companies are coming to U.S. capital markets for
two reasons. The first reason is the easy "Willie Sutton" answer
to the question of why you rob banks: "This is where the money
is." There is more money available, at less cost, in the United
States than in almost any of the home countries of the foreign
companies that are coming here.'
The second reason is really a negative reason - or the
avoidance of a negative in this case - and that is, our legal and
regulatory system is no longer scaring foreign companies away
from U.S. markets.'
* Partner, Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York, N.Y.; B.A., 1969,
Drury College;J.D., 1972, University of Chicago; LL.M., 1978, New York University. Mr.
Silkenat is a former Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of International
Law and Practice and is the Editor of The Moscow Conference on Law and Bilateral Economic
Relations and The ABA Guide to Foreign Law Firms.
1. See William E. Decker, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the US. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17
FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. S10, S11 (1994) (noting that United States is world's largest, most
open market).
2. See M. Shane Warbrick, Practical Company Experience in Entering U.S. Markets: Sig-
nificant Issues and Hurdles from the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. S112 (1994)
(discussing practical experience of Fletcher Challenge Ltd. entering U.S. markets);
Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to U.S. Markets, 17
FoiDun m INT'L L.J. (1994) S97, S98 (discussing flexibility of SEC in evaluating and
accommodating non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital markets); M. Elizabeth Ra-
der, Accounting Issues in Cross-Border Securities Offerings, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S129
(1994) (noting flexibility of SEC in assisting non-U.S. companies with accounting and
disclosure issues).
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Taking these two factors into account, there has been a dra-
matic increase in the number of foreign companies that have
entered the U.S. capital markets in recent months.3 In the last
year and a half, more than 140 foreign issuers from twenty-seven
countries have entered the U.S. public market for the first
time-companies like Daimler-Benz, Shanghai Petrochemical,
Enterprise Oil, and Alcatel Alsthom are just a few of the major
companies that have recently entered the U.S. market. Today,
more than 550 foreign companies are reporting, for one reason
or another, to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
in Washington about their on-going activities.
This is a major change in international finance, and the size
of this change in foreign companies coming to the U.S. markets
would not have been possible if the U.S. markets and its regula-
tors had not found a means to help foreign companies in a
number of different ways.
First, the regulatory costs that are involved in coming to
U.S. markets are lower than before. High costs are one of the
obstacles that has traditionally scared away foreign companies
from coming to the United States. The costs of investment bank-
ers, lawyers, accountants, filing fees, etc., had been too expensive
for foreign companies to come to the United States.
The second way that regulators and the U.S. market itself
have changed in order to help foreign companies is by facilitat-
ing the transition of those companies into the U.S. disclosure
system.4 By focusing on the differences between U.S. and non-
U.S. companies and finding a way to take account of those differ-
ences in the disclosure requirements of the United States, there
has been a significant change, which has opened up U.S. capital
3. See Decker, supra note 1, at S12 (noting "frantic pace" at which non-U.S. compa-
nies are presently entering U.S. capital markets); Joseph Velli, American Depositary Re-
ceipts: An Overview, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S38 (1994) (discussing increased use of ADRs
as alternative for non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital markets).
4. See Frode Jensen, III, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From a Legal Perspective, 17 FoRD-
HAM INT'L L.J. S25, S29 (1994) (discussing alternative methods for non-U.S. companies
to access U.S. capital markets); Velli, supra note 3, at S38 (discussing use of ADRs as
alternative method for non-U.S. company U.S. capital markets); Kosnik, supra note 2, at
S97 (discussing flexibility of SEC in evaluating and assisting non-U.S. companies enter-
ing U.S. capital markets). See generally James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Require-
mentsforForeign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM Irr'L L.J. S58 (1994) (discussing goal of
attracting non-U.S. companies to U.S. capital markets and further steps that should be
taken to encourage non-U.S. companies to enter U.S. markets).
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markets to foreign issuers.5
The third way that the U.S. market is responding to these
companies is by maintaining U.S. confidence in the market and
by continuing to insist on the principles of full disclosure and
investor protection, as required by U.S. securities laws.6
Unfortunately, these three changes somewhat conflict with
each other. I think, however, that it is the "balance" that has
continued to be important and that has led to the dramatic rise
in foreign companies coming to the U.S. markets.
But one of the main reasons that capital is available in such
such quantities in the U.S. markets is basically that the investor
trusts the U.S. markets to be fair. Fairness is a major issue. Even
though it sounds simplistic, it is a critical factor and one that is
absent, really to a surprising degree, in many of the sophisticated
foreign markets.
For example, although there have been a number of recent
efforts to curb insider trading on European exchanges and Euro-
pean markets, such efforts have had little practical effect to date
either on the insiders themselves or on the typical investor's per-
ception of how insiders act.7 The common belief in Europe that
certain investors have access to confidential information and
regularly profit from that information may be the major reason
why comparatively few Europeans actually own stock. In the
United States, nearly thirty-five percent of adults own shares di-
rectly. In Germany, that number is seven percent; fourteen per-
cent in France; and twenty percent in England. Those are siza-
5. See Warbrick, supra note 2, at S114-19 (discussing differences between New Zea-
land and U.S. methods of business); Kosnik, supra note 2, at S97-98 (discussing flexibil-
ity of SEC in evaluating and accommodating non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital
markets).
6. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7711 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Rich-
ard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic Trans-
formation, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. S77 (1994) (discussing need to maintain fundamental
principles of U.S. securities laws); Pat McConnell, Practical Company Experience in Enter-
ing U.S. Markets: Significant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's Perspective, 17 FonRnAm
ITr'L LJ. S120, S122 (1994) (discussing disclosure system in United States and how it
promotes efficiency and liquidity in U.S. capital markets); Matthew M. McKenna, Tax
Issues in Cross-Border Securities Offerings, 17 FoRDHAm INrT'L L.J. S140, S144 (1994) (noting
tax issues as disclosure obligation for non-U.S. companies).
7. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: An Uni-
form Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REv. 837 (1992); Dr. Gerhad Wegen, Address, Collo-
quium: Congratulations from Your Continental Cousins, 10b-5: Securities Fraud Regulation
from the European Perspective, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. S57 (1993).
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ble differences, and partially explain why the U.S. markets are so
active and why so much money is available for those companies
that seek to enter the U.S. markets.
On the regulatory side, which in the past has been cited as
the reason at least some foreign companies have stayed out of
the U.S. market, the use of insider trading statutes has resulted
in convictions in only two of fourteen major countries in West-
ern Europe. The enforcement capacity of these counties is mini-
mal even when the laws are focused properly.
At the same time that the appetite for U.S. capital has in-
creased abroad, the U.S. appetite for foreign companies in
which to invest has blossomed. U.S. investors, when they look
abroad for places to invest their money, no longer see the "great
unknown" with the typical American parochialism that we used
to find. Instead, U.S. investors now see returns on capital that
are much greater than they would be on purely domestic invest-
ments.
Of course, foreign companies have been tapping U.S. inves-
tors for capital for a number of years by selling "Yankee Bonds"
and by selling stock in the form of American Depositary Receipts
("ADRs"), which Joe Velli from The Bank of New York will be
talking to you about at greater length later this morning.' I do
not think Mr. Velli really can be seen as the "father of ADRs" -
he is not old enough - but I think he is seen as the closest living
relative of ADRs, and really is one of the key innovators in this
field.
The pace of both listed and private financing has been in-
creasing in the United States, holding steady for ADRs, but surg-
ing dramatically for bonds and debt securities. In the first half
of 1993, sixty-three new foreign stock issues, valued at U.S.$5.5
billion, were sold in the United States, which is about the same
as 1992. On the bond side, however, the numbers have been
dramatically larger and have almost doubled over the last year,
close to U.S.$50 billion.
One major factor in this growth of foreign financing in the
8. See Velli, supra note 3, at S38 (discussing increased use of ADRs as alternative for
non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital markets); see also Mark A. Saunders, American
Depositary Receipts: An Introduction to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 Foxan-
HAM INT'L L.J. 48 (1993) (discussing use of ADRs by foreign private issuers raising capi-
tal in United States); Kerry Hannon, Live here, invest abroad, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,
Apr. 4, 1994, at 65 (discussing growth of ADR market).
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United States is the wave of privatizations that has been taking
place in a number of markets around the world. Thus far, for-
eign markets have been unable to handle both the capital needs
created by these privatizations and their traditional corporate fi-
nancing needs. As a result, several of those companies have
been driven to the U.S. markets in search of the capital they
need to expand.
Another factor in the current success of the U.S. capital
markets in attracting foreign companies is a bit more subtle:
that is, the work of multilateral financial institutions, like the In-
ternational Finance Corporation ("IFC"),9 in helping good com-
panies in developing countries prepare to enter the U.S. market.
It is no longer unusual for companies from countries that our
parents never heard of to come to the U.S. markets and raise
hundreds of millions of dollars in offerings. A major reason for
this change is due to the pioneering work of institutions like
IFC.10
Finally, I think it is accurate to say that foreign companies
that have already listed stock on the U.S. exchanges and have
issued bonds in the United States have basically been pleased
with their reception. It has not been as hard as they thought it
would be, the costs have not been as high, the continuing regula-
tion has not been as bad on the disclosure side, and, after going
through the disclosure hoops, the regulatory hoops, and the ac-
counting hoops, the experience has resulted in much greater li-
quidity for the shareholders that have invested in these compa-
nies.11
The SEC has also recently announced several new steps that
will be taken to respond to the particular needs of foreign com-
panies in meeting the regulatory standards of the United States.
Richard Kosnik, from the SEC, will be talking about some of
those changes this afternoon in more detail.1"
In closing, I want to focus on the fine line, the delicate bal-
9. See Alain Soulard, The Role of Multilateral Financial Institutions in Bringing Develop-
ing Companies to U.S. Markets, 17 FoRDt A INT'L L.J. S145 (1994) (outlining IFC's role in
assisting capital market activities of companies from emerging market countries).
10. Id.
11. See Warbrick, supra note 2, at Si14-19 (discussing favorable experience of
Fletcher Challenge Ltd. in entering U.S. markets).
12. See Kosnik, supra note 2, at S101 (discussing regulatory changes by SEC that
have encouraged registration of foreign securities).
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ance, in the different arguments that exist on the issues we are
going to be talking about here - the delicate balance between,
on one side, over-regulation that scares foreign companies away
and, on the other side, relaxing the rules too much, which would
scare away U.S. investors; between making New York the finan-
cial capital of the world, on the one side, or making the fund-
raising activities flow to the lowest common denominator in
terms of regulation; and finally, the balance between what regu-
lators think is right and what bankers and advisors need for their
corporate customers.' 3
It may be that these problems are now being addressed in a
fair way and that we are in some sense dealing with the best of all
possible worlds. It certainly seems that way when you read the
newspaper and see the number of companies that are coming to
the United States. My guess, however, is that these issues will
always be with us because the issues themselves are indeed diffi-
cult ones, as you will see from some of the discussions we are
going to have today, and because the results are so important,
not just for the companies and firms we work for but for us as
citizens as well. Besides, if there were no arguments about this,
what would lawyers do to occupy their time?
13. Compare Cochrane, supra note 4, at S61 (stressing difficulty of requiring U.S.
GAAP for non-U.S. issuers) with Breeden, supra note 6, at S88 (arguing that U.S. GAAP
is most practical and efficient accounting method for foreign issuers). See generally Reg-
ulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a) (2) (1993) (requiring non-U.S. issuers to reconcile
their accounting standards with U.S. GAAP).
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